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We introduce a general framework for reasoning with prioritized propositional data by
aggregation of distance functions. Our formalism is based on a possible world semantics,
where conclusions are drawn according to the most ‘plausible’ worlds (interpretations),
namely: the worlds that are as ‘close’ as possible to the set of premises, and, at the
same time, are as ‘faithful’ as possible to the more reliable (or important) information
in this set. This implies that the consequence relations that are induced by our framework
are derived from a pre-deﬁned metric on the space of interpretations, and inferences are
determined by a ranking function applied to the premises. We study the basic properties
of the entailment relations that are obtained by this framework, and relate our approach to
other methods of maintaining incomplete and inconsistent information, most speciﬁcally in
the contexts of (iterated) belief revision, consistent query answering in database systems,
and integration of prioritized data sources.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Reasoning with prioritized data is at the heart of many information systems. Eminent examples for this are, e.g., database
systems or constraint data-sources, where integrity constraints are superior to raw data (see, for instance, [8,17,23,28]),
ranked knowledge-bases, where information is graded according to its reliability or accuracy [3,12–14], and (iterated) belief
revision, where more recent data gets higher precedence than older one [19,20,25,40]. There is no wonder, therefore, that
reasoning with prioritized information is a cornerstone of many formalisms for maintaining uncertainty, such as annotated
logic [38], possibilistic logic [21], and System Z [24].
Prioritized data is handled in this paper by a possible-world semantics, derived by distance considerations. To illustrate
this, consider the following example:
Example 1. Let Γ be a set of formulas, consisting of the following sub-theories:
Γ1 =
{
bird(x) → fly(x), color_of(Tweety,Red)},
Γ2 =
{
bird(Tweety), penguin(Tweety)
}
,
Γ3 =
{
penguin(x) → ¬fly(x)}.
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590 O. Arieli / Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008) 589–605Intuitively, Γ is a theory with three priority levels, where precedence is given to formulas that belong to sub-theories
with higher indices, that is, for 1 i < j  3, each formula in Γ j is considered more important (or more reliable) than the
formulas in Γi .
A justiﬁcation for the representation above may be the following: the highest level (Γ3) consists of integrity constraints
that should not be violated. In our case, the single rule in this level speciﬁes that a characteristic property of penguins is
that they cannot ﬂy, and there are no exceptions to that. The intermediate level (Γ2) contains some known facts about the
domain of discourse, and the lowest level (Γ1) consists of default assumptions about this domain (in our case, a bird can
ﬂy unless otherwise stated), and facts with lower certainty.
Note that as a ‘ﬂat’ set of assertions (i.e., when all the assertions in Γ have the same priority), this theory is classically
inconsistent, therefore everything follows from it, and so the theory is useless. However, as Γ is prioritized, one would like
to draw the following conclusions from it:
(1) Conclude bird(Tweety) and penguin(Tweety) (but not their negations), as these facts are explicitly stated in a
level that is consistent with the higher priority levels.
(2) Conclude ¬fly(Tweety) (and do not conclude fly(Tweety)), as this fact follows from the two top priority levels,
while its complement is inferable by a lower level (which, moreover, is inconsistent with the higher levels).
(3) Conclude color_of(Tweety,Red) (but not its negation), since although this fact appears in the lowest level of Γ ,
and that level is inconsistent with the other levels, it is not contradicted by any consistent fragment of Γ , so there is
no reason to believe that color_of(Tweety,Red) does not hold.
In this paper, we introduce a family of distance-based entailments and show that they successfully capture the kind of
reasoning described above. In this respect, this is a generalization of the approach in [4] for distance-based reasoning in the
non-prioritized case (see also [9]). In a nutshell, reasoning in our framework is based on the following two principles:
• A distance-based preference relation is deﬁned on the space of interpretations, so that inferences are drawn according
to the most preferred interpretations. In the example above, for instance, interpretations in which fly(Tweety) is
false will be ‘closer’ to Γ , and so more plausible, than interpretations in which fly(Tweety) is true (thus item (2)
above is obtained).
• Priorities are considered as extra-logical data that is exploited by an iterative process that ﬁrst computes interpreta-
tions that are as close as possible to higher-level sub-theories, and then makes preference among those interpretations
according to their closeness to lower-level sub-theories.
We show that different approaches to reasoning with uncertain and prioritized information can be described by these
general principles, and consider some interesting properties shared by the entailment relations that are obtained. For in-
stance, we show that many of those entailments can be considered as consequence relations in a ‘cautious’ sense (see
Theorem 1), and that they have a Katsuno–Mendelzon-like representation by faithful pre-orders on the space of interpreta-
tions (Theorem 4).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we formalize the intuition above and deﬁne a family
of distance-based aggregation functions and corresponding consequence relations for reasoning with prioritized data. Then,
in Section 3, we consider some basic properties of these consequence relations. In Section 4 we situate our formalism in
related areas such as iterated belief revision, database repair, and integration of independent and prioritized data-sources.
In Section 5 we conclude.1
2. Distance-based entailments for prioritized theories
In the sequel, L is a propositional language with a ﬁnite set Atoms of atomic formulas. We denote by t and f the Boolean
values ‘true’ and ‘false’, respectively. The space of the two-valued interpretations on Atoms is denoted ΛAtoms . A theory Γ
in L is a (possibly empty) ﬁnite multiset of formulas in L.2 The set of atomic formulas that occur in the formulas of Γ
is denoted Atoms(Γ ) and the set of models of Γ (that is, the interpretations on Atoms(Γ ) in which every formula in Γ is
true) is denoted mod(Γ ).
Deﬁnition 1. An n-prioritized theory is a theory Γ 〈n〉 in L, partitioned into n  1 sub-theories Γi (1  i  n). Notation:
Γ 〈n〉 = Γ1 ⊕ Γ2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn .
1 This is a revised and extended version of [5].
2 As we (implicitly) assume domain closure, propositional semantics is assured for every theory. First-order notations are sometimes used for a compact
representation of formulas in a theory.
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lower levels, so if 1 i < j  n then a formula ψ ∈ Γ j overtakes any formula φ ∈ Γi . Note that in this writing the precedence
is right-hand increasing.
Deﬁnition 2. Let Γ = Γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn be an n-prioritized theory.
• For any 1 i  n, we denote the n− i + 1 highest levels of Γ by Γi , that is, Γi = Γi ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn .
• We denote by Γi the ‘ﬂat’ (1-prioritized) theory, obtained by taking the union of the priority levels in Γi , that is,
Γi = Γi ∪ · · · ∪ Γn . Also, Γ = Γ1.
• The consistency level con of Γ is the minimal value i  n such that Γi is consistent. If there is no such value, we let
con = n+ 1 (and then Γcon = ∅).
Deﬁnition 3. A pseudo distance on a set U is a non-negative total function d :U × U → R, satisfying the following two
properties:
Symmetry: ∀u, v ∈ U d(u, v) = d(v,u).
Identity Preservation: ∀u, v ∈ U d(u, v) = 0 iff u = v .
A distance (metric) on U is a pseudo distance on U with the following property:
Triangulation: ∀u, v,w ∈ U d(u, v) d(u,w) + d(w, v).
Example 2. It is easy to verify that the following two functions are distances on ΛAtoms .
• The drastic distance: dU (ν,μ) = 0 if ν = μ and dU (ν,μ) = 1 otherwise.
• The Hamming distance: dH (ν,μ) = |{p ∈ Atoms | ν(p) 
= μ(p)} |.
The drastic distance is also known as the discrete metric, and Hamming distance is sometimes called Dalal distance [18].
For other representations of distances between propositional interpretations see, e.g., [30].
Deﬁnition 4. A numeric aggregation function f is a total function that accepts a multiset of real numbers and returns a real
number. It is non-decreasing in the values of its argument (i.e., f does not decrease when a multiset element is replaced
by a bigger element), f ({x1, . . . , xn}) = 0 iff x1 = · · · = xn = 0, and ∀x ∈R f ({x}) = x.
Deﬁnition 5. An aggregation function is called hereditary, if f ({x1, . . . , xn}) < f ({y1, . . . , yn}) implies that f ({x1, . . . , xn, z1, . . . ,
zm}) < f ({y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zm}).
In the sequel, we shall apply aggregation functions to distance values. As distances are non-negative, summation, average,
and maximum are all aggregation functions. Note, however, that while summation and average are hereditary, the maximum
function is not.
Deﬁnition 6. A pair P = 〈d, f 〉, where d is a pseudo distance and f is an aggregation function, is called a (distance-based)
preferential setting. Given a theory Γ = {ψ1, . . . ,ψn}, an interpretation ν , and a preferential setting 〈d, f 〉, we deﬁne:
• d(ν,ψi) =
{
min{d(ν,μ) | μ ∈mod(ψi)} if ψi is satisﬁable,
1+max{d(ν,μ) | ν,μ ∈ ΛAtoms} otherwise.
• δd, f (ν,Γ ) = f ({d(ν,ψ1), . . . ,d(ν,ψn)}).
Deﬁnition 7. A (pseudo) distance d is unbiased, if for every formula ψ and interpretations ν1, ν2, if ν1(p) = ν2(p) for every
p ∈ Atoms(ψ), then d(ν1,ψ) = d(ν2,ψ).
The last property assures that the ‘distance’ between an interpretation and a formula is independent of irrelevant atoms
(those that do not appear in the formula). Note, e.g., that the distances in Example 2 are unbiased.
For a preferential setting P = 〈d, f 〉 we now deﬁne an operator ΔP that introduces, for every n-prioritized theory Γ , its
‘most plausible’ interpretations, namely: the interpretations that are δd, f -closest to Γ .
Deﬁnition 8. Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a preferential setting. For an n-prioritized theory Γ = Γ1 ⊕ Γ2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn consider the
following n sets of interpretations:
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• Δn−iP (Γ ) =
{
ν ∈ Δn−i+1P (Γ ) | ∀μ ∈ Δn−i+1P (Γ ) δd, f (ν,Γn−i) δd, f (μ,Γn−i)
}
for every 1 i < n.
The sequence ΔnP (Γ ), . . . ,Δ
1
P (Γ ) is clearly non-increasing, as sets with smaller indices are subsets of those with bigger
indices. This reﬂects the intuitive idea that higher-level formulas are preferred over lower-level formulas, thus the interpre-
tations of the latter are determined by the interpretations of the former. Since the relevant interpretations are derived by
distance considerations, each set in the sequence above contains the interpretations that are δd, f -closest to the correspond-
ing sub-theory among the elements of the preceding set in the sequence.
We denote by ΔP (Γ ) the last set obtained by this sequence (that is, ΔP (Γ ) = Δ1P (Γ )). The elements of ΔP (Γ ) are the
most plausible interpretations of Γ . These are the interpretations according to which the Γ -conclusions are drawn.
Deﬁnition 9. Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a preferential setting. A formula ψ follows from an (n-prioritized) theory Γ , if every inter-
pretation in ΔP (Γ ) satisﬁes ψ (that is, if ΔP (Γ ) ⊆mod(ψ)). We denote this by Γ |P ψ .
Example 3. Let Γ be a grounding of the prioritized theory in Example 1, and let P = 〈dH ,Σ〉. Then:
Γ |P bird(Tweety), Γ |P penguin(Tweety),
Γ |P color_of(Tweety,Red), Γ |P ¬fly(Tweety),
Γ 
|P ¬bird(Tweety), Γ 
|P ¬penguin(Tweety),
Γ 
|P ¬color_of(Tweety,Red), Γ 
|P fly(Tweety),
as intuitively expected. In fact, using the results in the next section, one can show that the conclusions regarding
bird(Tweety), penguin(Tweety), and fly(Tweety) hold in every setting (Proposition 5); the conclusions about the
color of Tweety hold whenever d is unbiased and f is hereditary (see Proposition 7 and Note 3). The fact that the negations
of these conclusions do not follow from Γ is ensured by Proposition 3.
Two case studies
Before we get into details about common properties of |P , we demonstrate their usefulness by showing the correspon-
dence between two entailments of our framework and concrete prioritized merging operators that have been proposed in
the literature. For this, we ﬁrst need the following notations:
Deﬁnition 10. Let Γ = Γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn .
Con(Γ ) are the consistent subsets of (the ﬂat theory) Γ .
PriCon(Γ ) = {Γi1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γik | 1 i1 < · · · < ik  n, ⋃kj=1 Γi j ∈ Con(Γ )}.
The following order relations may be deﬁned on these sets:
Deﬁnition 11. The order relation ≺lex on PriCon(Γ ) is deﬁned as follows:
• Γi1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γik ≺lex Γ j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γ jl iff 〈ik, . . . , i1〉 is lexicographically smaller than 〈 jl, . . . , j1〉.
• We denote by ΓmLex the ≺lex-maximal element on PriCon(Γ ).
It is easy to see that ΓmLex is uniquely determined; it consists of Γcon and all the strata below con that can be added
to Γcon , by a decreasing order of their indices, without violating the consistency of what is obtained.
Deﬁnition 12. For Γ ′,Γ ′′ ∈ Con(Γ ), we denote:
• Γ ′ ≺card Γ ′′ iff
{∃1 k n |Γ ′ ∩ Γk| < |Γ ′′ ∩ Γk|, and
∀i > k |Γ ′ ∩ Γi | = |Γ ′′ ∩ Γi |.
• mCard(Γ ) = {Γ ′ ∈ Con(Γ ) | ¬∃Γ ′′ ∈ Con(Γ ) such that Γ ′ ≺card Γ ′′}.
Example 4. Consider the 3-prioritized theory Γ = Γ1 ⊕ Γ2 ⊕ Γ3, where Γ1 = {r}, Γ2 = {¬p, p → q, p → ¬q}, and Γ3 = {p}.
Then ΓmLex = {p, r} and mCard(Γ ) = {{p, p → q, r}, {p, p → ¬q, r}}.
As the next proposition shows, the two order relations considered in the last two deﬁnitions may be associated with
two corresponding preferential settings:
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• ΔdU ,max(Γ ) =mod(ΓmLex),3• ΔdU ,Σ (Γ ) = {ν | ν ∈mod(Γ ′) for some Γ ′ ∈ mCard(Γ )}.
Proof. The ﬁrst item follows from the fact that for every 1  i  n it holds that δdU ,max(ν,Γi) = 0 if ν ∈ mod(Γi) and
δdU ,max(ν,Γi) = 1 otherwise. The second item is obtained since δdU ,Σ (ν,Γi) = |{γ ∈ Γi | ν /∈mod(γ )}|. 
It follows, then, that Γ |〈dU ,max〉 ψ iff ψ is in the transitive closure of Γ mLex . This is a reﬁning of the possibilistic
merging operator considered by Benferhat et al. [12,13] for reasoning with ranked knowledge-bases, in which ψ follows
from Γ iff it is in the transitive closure of Γcon .4
The second item in Proposition 1 corresponds to the merging operator considered in [31] (see also [20]). We note,
moreover, that in case that every Γi in Γ is a singleton, this is actually a linear revision in the sense of Nebel [36], since
the iterated process can be represented as follows:
ΔdU ,Σ (Γi ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
mod(Γi) i = n,
ΔdU ,Σ (Γi+1) ∩mod(Γi) i < n, ΔdU ,Σ (Γi+1) ∩mod(Γi) 
= ∅,
ΔdU ,Σ (Γi+1) i < n, ΔdU ,Σ (Γi+1) ∩mod(Γi) = ∅.
Proposition 1 clariﬁes the inherent difference between the settings 〈dU ,max〉 and 〈dU ,Σ〉. In both cases the construction
of the most plausible interpretations is based on an iterative process of selecting formulas, from the highest stratum down
to the lowest one. Yet, when Σ is the underlying aggregation function, as many formulas as possible are considered as
long as consistency is not violated. On the other hand, when max is involved, a stratum is considered as a whole: either it
preserves consistency or it is dropped altogether.
3. Reasoning with |P
In this section, we consider some basic properties of |P . First, we examine ‘ﬂat’ theories, i.e., multisets in which all the
assertions have the same priority. This is analogous to distance-based non-prioritized reasoning, which is investigated in [4].
Proposition 2 recalls the main characteristics of the entailment relations in such cases.
Deﬁnition 13. Let us denote by | the standard classical entailment, that is: Γ | ψ if every model of Γ is a model of ψ .
Deﬁnition 14. Two sets of formulas Γ1 and Γ2 are called independent (or disjoint), if Atoms(Γ ′) ∩ Atoms(Γ ′′) = ∅. Two
independent theories Γ1 and Γ2 are a partition of a theory Γ , if Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2.
Proposition 2. (See [4].) Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a preferential setting and Γ a 1-prioritized theory. Then:
• |P is the same as the classical entailment with respect to consistent premises: if Γ is consistent, then for every ψ , Γ |P ψ iff
Γ | ψ .
• |P is weakly paraconsistent: inconsistent premises do not entail every formula (alternatively, for every Γ there is a formula ψ
such that Γ 
|P ψ ).
• |P is non-monotonic: the set of the |P -conclusions does not monotonically grow in the size of the premises.
If d is unbiased, then
• |P is paraconsistent: if ψ is a non-tautological formula that is independent of Γ , then Γ 
|P ψ .
If, in addition, f is hereditary, then
• |P is rationally monotonic [32]: if Γ |P ψ and φ is independent of Γ ∪ {ψ}, then Γ,φ |P ψ .
• |P is adaptive [10,11]: if {Γ1,Γ2} is a partition of Γ , Γ1 is classically consistent, and ψ is independent of Γ2 , then Γ1 | ψ
entails that Γ |P ψ .
The arrangement of the premises in a stratiﬁed structure of priority levels allows to reﬁne and generalize the results
above. As a trivial example, it is clear that the 1-prioritized inconsistent theory {p,¬p} is totally different than the 2-
prioritized theory {p} ⊕ {¬p}, as in the latter the symmetry between p and ¬p breaks up.
3 mod(Γ ), where Γ is a prioritized theory, is the same as mod(Γ ).
4 Indeed, as Γcon ⊆ Γ mLex , every conclusion that is obtained by the merging operator of [12,13] is also deducible by |〈dU ,max〉 .
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that even if the set of premises is not consistent, the set of its |P -conclusions remains classically consistent:
Proposition 3. For every setting P , prioritized theory Γ , and formula ψ , if Γ |P ψ then Γ 
|P ¬ψ .
Proof. Otherwise, ΔP (Γ ) ⊆ mod(ψ) and ΔP (Γ ) ⊆ mod(¬ψ). Since mod(ψ) ∩mod(¬ψ) = ∅, we get a contradiction to the
fact that ΔP (Γ ) 
= ∅ (as ΛAtoms is ﬁnite, there are always interpretations that are minimally δd, f -distant from Γ , and so
every theory has most plausible interpretations). 
Another characteristic property of |P is that priorities do have a primary role in the reasoning process; conclusions of
higher-level observations remain valid when the theory is augmented with lower-level observations.5
Proposition 4. Let Γ be an n-prioritized theory. Then for every 1 i < j  n, if Γ j |P ψ then Γi |P ψ .
Proof. If Γ j |P ψ then Δ jP (Γ ) ⊆mod(ψ). But ΔiP (Γ ) ⊆ Δ jP (Γ ), and so ΔiP (Γ ) ⊆mod(ψ) as well. Thus, Γi |P ψ . 
Proposition 4 implies, in particular, that anything that follows from a sub-theory that consists of the higher levels of
a prioritized theory, also follows from the whole theory. Next we show that when the sub-theory of the higher levels is
classically consistent, we can say more than that: anything that can be classically inferred from the highest consistent levels
of a prioritized theory is also deducible from the whole theory (even when lower-level sub-theories imply the converse). To
see this we suppose, then, that at least the most preferred level of Γ is classically consistent (that is, con n).
Proposition 5. For every setting P = 〈d, f 〉 and for every n-prioritized theory Γ with a consistency level con n, if Γcon | ψ then
Γ |P ψ .
For the proof of Proposition 5 we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For every preferential setting P = 〈d, f 〉 and for every n-prioritized theory Γ with con n, ΔP (Γcon) =mod(Γcon).
Proof. Let ν be a model of Γcon = Γcon ∪ · · · ∪Γn . Then ν is in particular a model of Γn = {ψ1, . . . ,ψk} and so d(ν,ψi) = 0
for every 1  i  k. Thus δd, f (ν,Γn) = 0 as well. Since for every interpretation μ, δd, f (μ,Γn)  0, we conclude that ν ∈
ΔP (Γn). By similar arguments one can show, for every con  j < n, that as ν ∈ ΔP (Γ j+1) and ν ∈ mod(Γ j), necessarily
ν ∈ ΔP (Γ j). It follows, then, that ν ∈ ΔP (Γcon).
For the converse, suppose that ν is not a model of Γcon . Then ν is not a model of Γ j for some con j  n. Hence, there
is a formula ψ ∈ Γ j such that d(ν,ψ) > 0. This implies that δd, f (ν,Γ j) > 0 as well. On the other hand, as Γcon is consistent
(by its deﬁnition), there is an element μ ∈ mod(Γcon). For this interpretation δd, f (μ,Γi) = 0 for every con  i  n. This
implies that ν /∈ ΔP (Γ j) and so ν /∈ ΔP (Γcon). 
Proof of Proposition 5. By the deﬁnition of ΔP and by Lemma 1, ΔP (Γ ) ⊆ ΔP (Γcon) =mod(Γcon). Now, if Γcon | ψ ,
then ψ is true in every element of mod(Γcon), and so ψ holds in every element of ΔP (Γ ). Thus Γ |P ψ . 
Note 1. Consider again the three-level theory of Example 1. Proposition 5 guarantees the satisfaction of the ﬁrst two items
discussed in that example (the third item is considered in Note 3 below).
Another immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is the following:
Proposition 6. For every setting P = 〈d, f 〉 and n-prioritized theory Γ with con n, we have that Γcon |P ψ iff Γcon | ψ .
In particular, then, |P coincides with the classical entailment with respect to consistent sets of premises:
Corollary 1. If Γ is consistent, then Γ |P ψ iff Γ | ψ .
Proof. By Proposition 6, since if Γ is consistent then con = 1, and so Γcon = Γ and Γcon = Γ . 
In the general case, we have the following relation between |P and |:
5 In [20] this is called ‘the principle of prioritized monotonicity’.
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Proof. If Γ is consistent then by Corollary 1 Γ |P ψ iff Γ | ψ . If Γ is not classically consistent, then for every formula ψ ,
Γ | ψ . 
Taken together, Corollaries 1 and 2 mean that as long as the consistency of the premises is preserved, priorities have
a vacuous role, as the set of conclusions coincides with the transitive closure of the corresponding ﬂat theory. This is in
a sharp contrast to situations in which the set of premises is not consistent, and then conclusions according to |P are
determined by the formulas in the higher consistent strata (Proposition 6), while reasoning with the ﬂat theory and the
standard classical entailment is degenerated.
A third corollary in this context is that conclusions of a consistent theory should not be retracted as long as the theory
is extended by formulas that preserve its consistency. To see this, we ﬁrst introduce the following notation:
Notation 1. Let Γ = Γ1 ⊕· · ·⊕Γn be an n-prioritized theory. Denote by Γ unionmultiψ the theories that are obtained by extending Γ
with a formula ψ , that is:
Γ unionmulti ψ =
{ {ψ} ⊕ Γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn, Γ1 ∪ {ψ} ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn, . . . ,
Γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn ∪ {ψ}, Γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn ⊕ {ψ}.
}
Corollary 3. If Γ |P ψ and Γ ∪ {φ} is consistent, then Γ ′ |P ψ for each Γ ′ ∈ Γ unionmulti φ .
Proof. If Γ ∪ {φ} is consistent then so is Γ . By Corollary 1, Γ |P ψ implies Γ | ψ , and so Γ ∪ {φ} | ψ . Since the set of
premises is consistent, we have, by Corollary 1 again, that Γ ′ |P ψ for every Γ ′ ∈ Γ unionmulti φ. 
Note 2. Unless consistency is assumed, the claim in Corollary 3 is not true, as in general |P is non-monotonic. Indeed,
{p} |P p while {p} ⊕ {¬p} 
|P p.
Next, we show that in many cases we can go beyond the results of Propositions 4 and 5: not only that one may deduce
from the whole theory everything that is included in its highest levels, but also lower-level assertions are deducible from
the whole theory, provided that no higher-level information contradicts them. This shows that our formalism avoids the
so called drowning effect, that is: formulas with low priority are not inhibited just due to the fact that the information at
higher levels is contradictory. Prevention of the drowning effect is very important, e.g., in the context of belief revision, as
it implies that anything that has no relation to the new information need not be revised.
Proposition 7. Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a setting where d is non-biased and f is hereditary. If a prioritized theory Γ can be partitioned to a
consistent theory Γ ′ and a (possibly inconsistent) theory Γ ′′ , then Γ |P ψ for every ψ ∈ Γ ′ .
Note 3. If Γ ′ ⊆ Γcon , then Proposition 7 is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 5. Yet, Proposition 7 is useful in
cases where Γ ′ contains elements that are below the consistency level of Γ , and then the claim assures that the drowning
effect is not imposed on these elements. The theory Γ , representing Tweety dilemma in Example 1, is a good example
for this. It can be partitioned to Γ ′ = {color_of(Tweety,Red)} and Γ ′′ = Γ \ Γ ′ . In this representation the conditions
of Proposition 7 are satisﬁed for every preferential setting P = 〈d, f 〉 where d is unbiased and f is hereditary. In this
case, then, Γ |P color_of(Tweety,Red), as indeed is suggested in the third item of Example 1. Note, however, that
Γ 
|dU ,max color_of(Tweety,Red), which shows that the condition in Proposition 7, that the aggregation function should
be hereditary, is indeed necessary.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose for a contradiction that Γ 
|P ψ for some ψ ∈ Γ ′ . Then there is an interpretation ν ∈
ΔP (Γ ) such that ν(ψ) = f. Also, since ψ ∈ Γ ′ and since Γ ′ is classically consistent, every model of Γ ′ satisﬁes ψ . So let μ
be a model of Γ ′ . Consider an interpretation σ deﬁned, for every p ∈ Atoms, as follows:
σ(p) =
{
μ(p) if p ∈ Atoms(Γ ′),
ν(p) otherwise.
Let φ be a formula in Γ . If φ ∈ Γ ′ then by the deﬁnition of σ , σ(φ) = μ(φ) and as μ ∈mod(Γ ′) and d is unbiased,
d(σ ,φ) = d(μ,φ) = 0 d(ν,φ). (1)
Moreover, for φ = ψ we have that
d(σ ,φ) = d(μ,φ) = 0 < d(ν,φ). (2)
If φ ∈ Γ ′′ , σ(φ) = ν(φ), since Γ ′ and Γ ′′ are not dependent. Thus, since d is unbiased,
d(σ ,φ) = d(ν,φ). (3)
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that ψ ∈ Γi , and since f is hereditary, it follows that δd, f (σ ,Γi) < δd, f (ν,Γi) and for every other 1 j  n, δd, f (σ ,Γ j)
δd, f (ν,Γ j). This implies that ν /∈ ΔiP (Γ ) and so ν /∈ ΔP (Γ ); a contradiction. 
Example 5. According to the possibilistic revision operator that is introduced in [12,13], a formula ψ is a consequence of
a prioritized (possibilistic) theory Γ if it follows from all the formulas above the consistency level of Γ . In our notations,
then, ψ follows from Γ iff Γcon | ψ ,6 and so this formalism has the drowning effect, which prevents the drawing of any
conclusion that resides below the consistency level. In other formalisms for handling prioritized theories, such as those in
[3,16,35], the drowning effect is avoided by using a similar policy as ours, namely: the elements of the revised theory are
constructed in a stepwise manner, starting with the highest priority level and selecting from each level as many formulas
as possible without violating consistency (see also [20] and the case studies in Section 2).
Concerning the computational complexity of entailments in our framework, it is clear from Corollary 1 that one cannot
hope for better complexity results than those for the classical propositional logic, as for consistent premises the entailment
problem is coNP-Complete. On the other hand, it is clear from Deﬁnitions 8, 9, and the fact that ΛAtoms is ﬁnite, that for
polynomially computable distances and aggregation functions, reasoning with |P is in EXP, i.e., it is decidable with (at
most) exponential complexity. A complexity analysis regarding some particular distance-based operators is given in [27]
and [28].
We conclude this section by checking to what extent |P may be considered a consequence relation.
Deﬁnition 15. A (Tarskian) consequence relation [39] is a relation  between multisets of formulas and formulas, that satisﬁes
the following conditions:
Reﬂexivity: Γ  ψ for every ψ ∈ Γ .
Monotonicity: if Γ  ψ and Γ ⊆ Γ ′ then Γ ′  ψ .
Transitivity(Cut): if Γ1  ψ and Γ2,ψ  φ then Γ1,Γ2  φ.
Clearly, Deﬁnition 15 is applied only to ﬂat theories, but as it is shown in [4], |P does not satisfy any of the properties
in Deﬁnition 15 already when ﬂat (1-prioritized) theories are considered. Yet, as the entailment relations induced by our
framework are meant to deal with contradictions and to reﬂect belief revision, they cannot be reﬂexive nor monotonic.
Indeed, for any setting P , Proposition 3 shows that either {p,¬p} 
|P p or {p,¬p} 
|P ¬p, and so |P is not reﬂexive.
As Note 2 shows, |P is not monotonic either, and similar considerations invalidate (prioritized versions of) transitivity in
our case. However, although |P is not a consequence relation in the usual sense, it does satisfy the weaker conditions in
Deﬁnition 16 below, which guarantee a ‘proper behaviour’ of non-monotonic entailments in the presence of inconsistency
(see also [6]).
Deﬁnition 16. A (prioritized) cautious consequence relation is a relation |∼ between prioritized theories and formulas in L,
that satisﬁes the following conditions: for every prioritized theory Γ , a satisﬁable formula ψ , and a formula φ in L,
Cautious Reﬂexivity: if Γ ′ and Γ ′′ are a partition of Γ ,7 and Γ ′ is consistent, then Γ |∼ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ ′.
Cautious Monotonicity: if Γ |∼ψ and Γ |∼φ, then Γ ⊕ {ψ}|∼φ.
Cautious Transitivity: if Γ |∼ψ and Γ ⊕ {ψ}|∼φ, then Γ |∼φ.8
Theorem 1. Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a setting where d is non-biased and f is hereditary. Then |P is a cautious consequence relation.
Proof. See Appendix A of the paper. 
Another set of accepted principles for non-monotonic consequence operators was introduced in [29] (see also [34]).
Below, we adapt it for prioritized premises.
6 Note that by Proposition 5 this implies that every possibilistic conclusion of Γ may be inferred also by our formalisms.
7 In the sense of Deﬁnition 14.
8 These are the prioritized versions of cautious monotonicity and cautious transitivity. The original versions of these rules are deﬁned for ﬂat theories in
[22] and in [29] respectively, where Γ ⊕ {ψ} is replaced by Γ ∪ {ψ} (see also [34]).
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cautious monotonicity, cautious transitivity (as in Deﬁnition 16), and the following rules:
Weak Reﬂexivity: if ψ is satisﬁable then Γ ⊕ {ψ}|∼ψ .
Right Weakening: if | ψ → φ and Γ |∼ψ then Γ |∼φ.
Left Logical Equivalence: if | ψ ↔ φ and Γ ⊕ {ψ}|∼σ then Γ ⊕ {φ}|∼σ .
Or: if Γ ⊕ {ψ}|∼σ and Γ ⊕ {φ}|∼σ then Γ ⊕ {ψ ∨ φ}|∼σ .
Theorem 2. Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a setting where d is non-biased and f is hereditary. Then |P is prioritized preferential.
Proof. See Appendix A of the paper. 
4. Related areas and applications
In this section we consider in greater detail three different paradigms in which knowledge is represented in terms of
prioritized theories and is processed by distance-based entailments.
4.1. Iterated belief revision
Belief revision, the process of changing beliefs in order to take into account new pieces of information, is perhaps closest
in spirit to the basic ideas behind our framework. A widely accepted rationality criterion in this context is the success
postulate that asserts that a new item of information is always accepted. In our case, this means that new data should
have a higher priority over older one. Thus, assuming that Γ represents the reasoner’s belief, the revised belief state in
light of new information ψ may be represented by Γ ⊕{ψ}. Consequently, a revision by a sequence of (possibly conﬂicting)
observations ψ1, . . . ,ψm may be expressed by Γ ⊕ {ψ1} ⊕ · · · ⊕ {ψm}.
The following set of rationality postulates, introduced in [1] by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM) for belief
revision in the non-prioritized case, is often considered as the starting point in this area.
Deﬁnition 18. Let K be a belief state, i.e., a deductively closed set of formulas, and let ψ be a formula. We denote by K + ψ
the logical closure of K ∪ ψ , and by ◦ a revision operator, i.e., an operator that accepts a belief state and a formula, and
produces a new belief state. The AGM postulates for ◦ are the following conditions:
K ◦ ψ is a belief state (i.e., it is closed under logical consequences),
ψ belongs to K ◦ ψ ,
K ◦ ψ ⊆ K + ψ ,
if ¬ψ /∈ K then K ◦ ψ = K + ψ ,
K ◦ ψ is inconsistent only if ψ is inconsistent,
if ψ and φ are logically equivalent, then K ◦ ψ = K ◦ φ,
K ◦ (ψ ∧ φ) ⊆ (K ◦ ψ) + φ,
if ¬φ /∈ K ◦ ψ then (K ◦ ψ) + φ ⊆ K ◦ (ψ ∧ φ).
In [26] the AGM postulates were rephrased by Katsuno and Mendelzon in terms of order relations as follows:
Proposition 8. Let Γ be a set of formulas in a propositional language L. A revision operator ◦ satisﬁes the AGM postulates if and only
if there is a faithful order Γ , such that mod(Γ ◦ ψ) =min(mod(ψ),Γ ).9
In light of this result, one may represent revision in our framework in terms of minimization of a preferential (ranking)
order. For this, we consider the following adjustment, to the context of prioritized theories, of faithful orders.
Deﬁnition 19. Let P be a preferential setting and Γ a prioritized theory. A total pre-order PΓ on ΛAtoms is called (prefer-
entially) faithful, if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(1) If ν,μ ∈ ΔP (Γ ) then ν <PΓ μ does not hold.
(2) If ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ) and μ /∈ ΔP (Γ ) then ν <PΓ μ.
Theorem 3. A preferential setting P is characterized by faithful orders: for every prioritized theory Γ there is a faithful order PΓ
(depending on P and Γ ), such that ΔP (Γ ) = {ν ∈ ΛAtoms | ∀μ ∈ ΛAtoms ν PΓ μ}.
9 The reader is referred, e.g., to [19,25] for detailed discussions on this result and its notions.
598 O. Arieli / Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008) 589–605Theorem 4. Let P be a preferential setting and Γ a prioritized theory on L. Then there is a faithful order PΓ (depending on P and
Γ ), such that, for every non-contradictory formula ψ in L, ΔP (Γ ⊕ ψ) =min(mod(ψ),PΓ ).
The proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 appear in Appendix A. It is interesting to note that the order relation in these theorems
is the same, and so, in terms of entailments, they may be combined and rewritten as follows:
Corollary 4. Let P be a preferential setting, Γ a prioritized theory, and ψ a non-contradictory formula in L. Then there is a faithful
order PΓ , such that, for every formula φ in L,
(1) Γ |P φ iff φ is satisﬁed by every PΓ -minimal element of ΛAtoms .
(2) Γ ⊕ ψ |P φ iff φ is satisﬁed by every PΓ -minimal element of mod(ψ).
Note 4. In [26] a belief base Γ is represented by a single formula, which is the conjunction of the elements in Γ . In the
prioritized setting this is, of course, not possible, as different formulas in Γ have different priorities. Also, in [26] the faithful
property is deﬁned in terms of mod(Γ ) rather than ΔP (Γ ). This distinction follows again from the fact that in the non-
prioritized case the formula that represents a belief set Γ is consistent and as such it always has models, while in our case
a prioritized theory Γ =⊕i Γi is different than the ‘ﬂat’ theory ⋃i Γi that may not even be consistent.
Theorem 4 is relevant for a single revision. For successive revisions one may follow Darwiche and Pearl’s approach [19],
extending the AGM postulates with four additional ones. As it turns out, three of these postulates hold in our context:
Deﬁnition 20. We denote by Γ ≡P Γ ′ that Γ and Γ ′ have the same |P -conclusions.
Proposition 9. For every preferential setting P = 〈d, f 〉, prioritized theory Γ , and satisﬁable formulas ψ,φ ,
C1: If ψ | φ then Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} ≡P Γ ⊕ {ψ}.
C3: If Γ ⊕ {ψ} |P φ then Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} |P φ .
C4: If Γ ⊕ {ψ} 
|P ¬φ then Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} 
|P ¬φ .
Proof. For [C1], note that if ψ | φ then mod(ψ) ⊆ mod(φ), which implies that ∀ν ∈ mod(ψ) d(ν,φ) = 0. Thus, ∀ν ∈
ΔP ({ψ}) d(ν,φ) = 0, and so ΔP ({ψ}) = ΔP ({φ} ⊕ {ψ}) = mod(ψ). It follows that ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}) = ΔP (Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ}),
and therefore Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} ≡P Γ ⊕ {ψ}.
For [C3], suppose that Γ ⊕ {ψ} |P φ. Then ψ 
|P ¬φ, otherwise, by Proposition 4, Γ ⊕ {ψ} |P ¬φ, which contradicts
Proposition 3. Thus, there is ν ∈ ΔP ({ψ}) such that ν(φ) = t. Now, if there is μ ∈ ΔP ({ψ}) such that μ(φ) = f, then
d(μ,φ) > 0 = d(ν,φ), and so for every aggregation function f , δd, f (ν, {ψ}) = δd, f (μ, {ψ}) but δd, f (ν, {φ}) < δd, f (μ, {φ}). It
follows that μ /∈ ΔP ({φ} ⊕ {ψ}), thus {φ} ⊕ {ψ} |P φ. By Proposition 4 again, Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} |P φ.
For [C4], suppose that Γ ⊕{ψ} 
|P ¬φ. This implies that ψ 
|P ¬φ, otherwise, by Proposition 4, Γ ⊕{ψ} |P ¬φ, which
contradicts our assumption. Thus, there is ν ∈ ΔP ({ψ}) such that ν(φ) = t. If there is μ ∈ ΔP ({ψ}) such that μ(φ) = f,
then by similar considerations as those for [C3], it holds that for every f , δd, f (ν, {ψ}) = δd, f (μ, {ψ}) but δd, f (μ, {φ}) >
δd, f (ν, {φ}), and so μ /∈ ΔP ({φ} ⊕ {ψ}). It follows that {φ} ⊕ {ψ} |P φ and by Proposition 4 again, Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} |P φ.
Now, by Proposition 3, Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} 
|P ¬φ. 
The forth postulate in [19], namely
C2: If ψ | ¬φ then Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} ≡P Γ ⊕ {ψ}
is the most controversial one (see, e.g., [25,28]), and indeed in our framework it is falsiﬁed. To see this, let Γ = ∅, ψ =
p, φ = ¬p ∧ ¬q, and P = 〈dH , f 〉 for any aggregation function f .10 Clearly, ψ | ¬φ. However, as ΔP ({ψ}) consists of
interpretations that assign t to p regardless of their assignments to q, while the interpretations in ΔP ({φ} ⊕ {ψ}) assign t
to p and f to q, it follows that {φ} ⊕ {ψ} and {ψ} are not |P -equivalent, so obviously Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {ψ} and Γ ⊕ {ψ} are not
|P -equivalent too.
In [25], Jin and Thielscher introduced the postulate of independence ([Ind]) as a reasonable counterpart to [C2] for the
design of rational iterated belief revision operators. As it turns out, this alternative postulate is preserved in our framework:
Proposition 10. For every preferential setting P = 〈d, f 〉, prioritized theory Γ , and satisﬁable formulas ψ,φ ,
Ind: If Γ ⊕ {¬ψ} 
|P ¬φ then Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {¬ψ} |P φ .
10 f is irrelevant here since each priority level is a singleton.
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|P ¬φ, then ¬ψ 
|P ¬φ (otherwise, by Proposition 4 we get a contradiction the assumption). Thus,
there is ν ∈ ΔP ({¬ψ}) such that ν(φ) = t. If there is μ ∈ ΔP ({¬ψ}) such that μ(φ) = f, then for every d and f ,
δd, f (ν, {¬ψ}) = δd, f (μ, {¬ψ}) but δd, f (μ, {φ}) > δd, f (ν, {φ}), and so μ /∈ ΔP ({φ}⊕ {¬ψ}). It follows that {φ}⊕ {¬ψ} |P φ,
thus, by Proposition 4, Γ ⊕ {φ} ⊕ {¬ψ} |P φ. 
4.2. Database repair and consistent query answering
A database DB is a pair (D, IC), where the database instance D is a ﬁnite subset of Atoms, and the set of integrity
constraints IC is a ﬁnite and consistent set of formulas in L. The meaning of D is usually determined by the conjunction
of its facts, augmented with Reiter’s closed world assumption [37], stating that each atomic formula that does not appear
in D is false: CWA(D) = {¬p | p /∈ D}. Now, as the integrity constraints must always be satisﬁed, they are superior to any
explicit (i.e., in D) or implicit (in CWA(D)) database fact. It follows, then, that a database DB = (D, IC) may be associated
with the following two-level prioritized theory:
ΓDB =
(D ∪ CWA(D))⊕ IC.
A database (D, IC) is consistent if all the integrity constraints are satisﬁed by the (explicit or implicit) database facts, i.e.:
mod(D ∪ CWA(D)) ⊆ mod(IC). When a database is not consistent, at least one integrity constraint is violated, and so it is
usually required to ‘repair’ the database, i.e., restore its consistency.
Deﬁnition 21. (See [2].) A (cardinality-based) repair of a database DB = (D, IC) is a pair (Insert,Retract) of two sets of
ground atomic facts, such that:
(1) Insert ∩ D = ∅,
(2) Retract ⊆ D,
(3) ((D ∪ Insert) \ Retract,IC) is a consistent database, and
(4) (Insert,Retract) is minimal in its cardinality: there is no pair (Insert′,Retract′) that satisﬁes conditions 1–3 and |Insert′ ∪
Retract′| < |Insert ∪ Retract|.
The set of all the repairs of DB is denoted Rep(DB).
Example 6. Let DB = (D, IC) be a database with a relation teaches of the schema (course_name,teacher_name).
Consider the database instance
D = {teaches(c1,n1),teaches(c2,n2),teaches(c2,n3)},
and an integrity constraint stating that the same course cannot be taught by two different teachers:
IC = {∀xyz(teaches(x, y) ∧ teaches(x, z) → y = z)}.11
Clearly, DB is not consistent. Its consistency may be restored by deleting either teaches(c2,n2) or teaches(c2,n3)
from D. Moreover, assuming that the integrity constraint cannot be altered, these are the most compact ways of ‘repairing’
DB, in the sense that any other solution requires a larger amount of changes (i.e., insertions or retractions) in D. The two
repairs of DB in this case are therefore R1 = (∅, {teaches(c2,n2)}) and R2 = (∅, {teaches(c2,n3)}). Note also that
according to both of these minimal repairs of DB the fact teaches(c1,n1) remains in DB.
Cardinality-based repair is considered, e.g., in [2,7,8,15,33]. Clearly, the repaired database should be consistent and at
the same time as close as possible to D. This distance-based consideration is the basic idea behind many approaches for
database repair and consistent query answering in database systems. Evidently, this approach can be captured also within
our framework:
Deﬁnition 22. Given a repair R = (Insert,Retract) of a database DB = (D, IC), the interpretation νR that is associated with
R is deﬁned for every p ∈ Atoms as follows:
νR(p) =
{
t if p ∈ (D ∪ Insert) \ Retract,
f otherwise.
The following result, adjusted to our notations and terminology, is shown in [7]. It identiﬁes the most plausible interpre-
tations of ΓDB with those that are associated with the repairs of DB:
11 As we remain on the propositional level, this formula should be viewed as representing the corresponding set of ground formulas formed by substituting
each variable with every constant in the database domain.
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Example 7. Consider again the database DB of Example 6. For the setting P = 〈dU ,Σ〉 we have that ΔP (ΓDB) = {ν1, ν2},
where:
ν1
(
teaches(c1,n1)
)= ν1(teaches(c2,n2))= t, ν1(teaches(c2,n3))= f,
ν2
(
teaches(c1,n1)
)= ν2(teaches(c2,n3))= t, ν2(teaches(c2,n2))= f.
In the notations of Example 6 and Deﬁnition 22, it is easy to verify that ν1 = νR1 and ν2 = νR2 , thus the most plausible
valuations of ΓDB are associated with the repairs of DB, as Proposition 11 suggests.
Note 5. If DB is consistent, its unique repair R = (∅,∅) intuitively indicates that there is nothing to repair in this case. By
Proposition 11, we have that Δ〈dU ,Σ〉(ΓDB) = {νR}, where νR(p) = t iff p ∈ D. This indeed is the expected most plausible
interpretation in our case.
As an immediate result of Proposition 11 we get the following criterion for consistent query answering by distance
considerations:
Corollary 5. LetP = 〈dU ,Σ〉,DB a (possibly inconsistent) database, andQ a query (i.e., a formula inL) posed toDB. Then ΓDB |P
Q iff Q is true in every interpretation that is associated with a repair of DB.
Example 8. For the database DB and the setting P = 〈dU ,Σ〉 considered in Examples 6 and 7, we have that
ΓDB |P teaches(c1,n1),
ΓDB 
|P teaches(c2,n2), and ΓDB 
|P teaches(c2,n3).
Thus, among the facts in D, only teaches(c1,n1) follows from ΓDB . This is in line with the fact that teaches(c1,n1)
is the only element in D that is not affected by either of the two repairs of DB (as it is not involved in any violation of the
integrity constraint).
4.3. Prioritized integration of independent data sources
Information systems often have to incorporate several sources with possibly different preferences. In this section we
show how this can be done in our framework. For this, we use two types of distance aggregations: internal aggregations, for
prioritizing different formulas in the same theory, and external aggregations, for prioritizing different theories. As internal
and external aggregations may reﬂect different kinds of considerations, they are represented by two different aggregation
functions, denoted f and g , respectively. Now, using the terminology and the notations of the previous sections, we can
think of the underlying n-prioritized theory as follows:
Γ = {Γ 11 , . . . ,Γ 1k1}⊕ · · · ⊕ {Γ n1 , . . . ,Γ nkn}, (4)
where now each Γ ij is a different theory, theories with the same superscript have the same precedence, and Γ
i is preferred
over Γ j iff i > j. This can be formalized by the following generalizations of Deﬁnitions 6 and 8:
Deﬁnition 23. An extended preferential setting is a triple E = 〈d, f , g〉, where d is a pseudo distance and f , g are aggregation
functions. Given an n-prioritized theory Γ = {Γ 11 , . . . ,Γ 1k1 } ⊕ · · · ⊕ {Γ n1 , . . . ,Γ nkn } and an interpretation ν , deﬁne for every
1 i  n and 1 j  ki the value of δd, f (ν,Γ ij ) just as in Deﬁnition 6. Also, let
δE
(
ν,Γ i
)= δd, f ,g(ν,Γ i )= g({δd, f (ν,Γ i1), . . . , δd, f (ν,Γ iki )}).
Deﬁnition 24. Let E = 〈d, f , g〉 be an extended preferential setting. Given an n-prioritized theory Γ = {Γ 11 , . . . ,Γ 1k1 } ⊕ · · · ⊕{Γ n1 , . . . ,Γ nkn }, consider the following n sets of interpretations:
• ΔnE (Γ ) = {ν ∈ ΛAtoms | ∀μ ∈ ΛAtoms δE (ν,Γ n) δE (μ,Γ n)},
• Δn−iE (Γ ) = {ν ∈ Δn−i+1E (Γ ) | ∀μ ∈ Δn−i+1E (Γ ) δE (ν,Γ n−i) δE (μ,Γ n−i)} for every 1 i < n.
The most plausible interpretations of Γ (with respect to d, f , g) are the interpretations in Δ1E (Γ ) (henceforth denoted by
ΔE (Γ )).
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Deﬁnition 25. Let E = 〈d, f , g〉 be an extended preferential setting. A formula ψ follows from an n-prioritized theory Γ if
each interpretation in ΔE (Γ ) satisﬁes ψ . We denote this by Γ |E ψ .
Clearly, Deﬁnition 25 generalizes Deﬁnition 9 in the sense that if in (4) above ki = 1 for every 1 i  n, then for every
g , |E (in the sense of Deﬁnition 25) is the same as |P (in the sense of Deﬁnition 9).12 The work in [27,28] on merging
operators under constraints may also be viewed as a particular instance of our framework, where all the merged sub-
theories have the same priority (that is, n = 1 in (4) above), and in each sub-theory the constraints have higher priority
than the rest of the data (thus all the merged theories are 2-prioritized).13
Example: constraint-based merging of prioritized data-sources
Consider the following scenario regarding speculations on the stock exchange (see also [28]). An investor consults with
four ﬁnancial experts about their opinions regarding four different shares, denoted s1, s2, s3 and s4. The opinion of expert i
is represented by a theory (data-source) Γi . Suppose that
Γ1 = Γ2 = {s1, s2, s3}, Γ3 = {¬s1,¬s2,¬s3,¬s4}, Γ4 = {s1, s2,¬s4}.
Thus, for instance, expert 4 suggests to buy shares s1 and s2, doesn’t recommend to buy share s4, and doesn’t have an
opinion about s3.
Suppose, in addition, that the investor has his own restrictions about the investment policy. For instance, if some share,
say s4, is considered risky, buying it may be balanced by purchasing at least two out of the three other shares, and vice-
versa. This may be represented by the following integrity constraint:
IC = {s4 ←→ ((s1 ∧ s2) ∨ (s2 ∧ s3) ∨ (s1 ∧ s3))}.
Assuming that all the expert are equally faithful, their suggestions may be represented by the 2-prioritized theory
Γ = {Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Γ4} ⊕ {IC},
in which the investor’s constraint about the purchasing policy is of higher precedence than the experts’ opinions. For the
extended setting 〈dU ,Σ,Σ〉 we get that the most plausible interpretations of Γ are the elements of the following set:
ΔdU ,Σ,Σ(Γ ) =
{
ν ∈mod(IC) | ∀μ ∈mod(IC) δdU ,Σ,Σ
(
ν, {Γi | 1 i  4}
)
 δdU ,Σ,Σ
(
μ, {Γi | 1 i  4}
)}
.
The models of IC and their distances to Γ = {Γ1, . . . ,Γ4} are given below.
s1 s2 s3 s4 δdU ,Σ,Σ (νi ,Γ )
ν1 t t t t 5
ν2 t t f t 7
ν3 t f t t 7
ν4 t f f f 7
s1 s2 s3 s4 δdU ,Σ,Σ (νi ,Γ )
ν5 f t t t 7
ν6 f t f f 6
ν7 f f t f 6
ν8 f f f f 8
Thus, ΔdU ,Σ,Σ(Γ ) = {ν1}, and so the investor will purchase all the four shares.
Clearly, the experts could have different reputations, and this may affect the investor’s decision. For instance, assuming
that expert 4 has a better reputation than the other experts, his or her opinion may get a higher precedence, yielding the
following 3-prioritized theory:
Γ ′ = {Γ1,Γ2,Γ3) ⊕ {Γ4} ⊕ {IC}.
It is interesting to note that in this case the recommendation of the most signiﬁcant expert (number 4) does not comply
with the investor’s restriction.
By using the same setting as before (d = dU , f = g = Σ ), the investor ends up with a different investment policy,
according to the following table:
s1 s2 s3 s4 δdU ,Σ,Σ (νi ,Γ4) δdU ,Σ,Σ (νi , {Γ1,Γ2,Γ3})
ν1 t t t t 1 0+ 0+ 4= 4
ν2 t t f t 1 1+ 1+ 3= 5
ν3 t f t t 2 N.A.
ν4 t f f f 1 1+ 1+ 1= 3
ν5 f t t t 2 N.A.
ν6 f t f f 1 1+ 1+ 1= 3
ν7 f f t f 2 N.A.
ν8 f f f f 2 N.A.
12 Alternatively, |E coincides with |P if in (4) each T ij is a singleton and g = f .
13 Alternatively, all the merged sources are viewed as ﬂat theories, and the set of ‘global constraint’ acts as a special (ﬂat) theory of higher priority (as in
the ﬁrst part of the next example).
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′) = {ν4, ν6}, and the decision would be to purchase either s1 or s2, but not both, which seems as a ‘fair
balance’ between the investor’s restriction and the recommendation of the most signiﬁcant expert (taking into account also
the other recommendations).
5. Summary and conclusion
The primary goal of this paper was to consider some of the main logical properties of distance-based entailments for
prioritized theories. As such, this work extends the results of [4] in two aspects: introducing preferences among different
formulas within the same theory, and enabling preferences among different sources of information. The former is usually
useful for revising theories while the latter is helpful for merging them. It is shown that within our framework it is possible
to deﬁne cautious consequence relations that are paraconsistent, non-monotonic, and avoid the drowning effect. In relation
to successive belief revision it is shown that the underlying entailments are deﬁnable in terms of minimization of preferen-
tial (ranking) orders. A characteristic property of these entailments is that to a large extent they retain consistency as they
coincide with the entailment of classical logic as long as the set of premises is kept consistent. Moreover, even when the
theory becomes inconsistent, conclusions corresponding to classical logic may be drawn according to the higher strata, as
long as they are still consistent.
The next natural step is to consider ﬁrst-order languages. One way to deal with this is by grounding the underlying
theory, and so to reduce it to the propositional case. This is a common method in the contexts considered in Section 4, but,
clearly, it is time and space consuming. A more direct approach for handling ﬁrst-order (prioritized) theories is a subject for
a future work.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Theorems 1–4
Given a preferential setting P = 〈d, f 〉, one can associate an n-prioritized theory Γ with the following order relation on
ΛAtoms:
ν1 PΓ ν2 iff ν2 /∈ ΔnP (Γ ), or ν2 ∈ ΔiP (Γ ) ⇒ ν1 ∈ ΔiP (Γ ) for every 1 i  n.
ν1 <
P
Γ ν2 iff ν1 PΓ ν2 and not ν2 PΓ ν1.
Intuitively, ν1 PΓ ν2 means that in the preferential setting P , ν1 is an interpretation of Γ that is at least as plausible as
the interpretation provided by ν2. This is justiﬁed by the next result (Proposition 12):
Deﬁnition 26. Given a setting P and an n-prioritized theory Γ . The function plΓ :ΛAtoms → {1, . . . ,n + 1}, is deﬁned as
follows:
plΓ (ν) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
n+ 1 if ν /∈ ΔnP (Γ ),
j if ν ∈ Δ jP (Γ ) \ Δ j−1P (Γ ) for some n j > 1,
1 if ν ∈ Δ1P (Γ ).
plΓ (ν) is called the Γ -plausibility of ν .
Clearly, plΓ is well deﬁned, since if plΓ (ν) = j then p /∈ Δ j−1P (Γ ), and so p /∈ ΔkP (Γ ) for any k j − 1. This implies the
following representation of plΓ :
plΓ (ν) =
{
n+ 1 if ν /∈ ΔnP (Γ ),
min{ j | ν ∈ Δ jP (Γ )} otherwise.
Note that smaller values of pl indicate higher plausibility of the arguments. In particular, the Γ -plausibility of the most
plausible interpretations of Γ is 1.
Example 9. Let Γ = {¬p,q} ⊕ {p} ⊕ {¬q}. We denote by [x, y] the interpretation that assigns x to p and y to q (x, y ∈ {t, f}).
Then in any preferential setting P we have plΓ ([t, f]) = 1, plΓ ([f, f]) = 3, and plΓ ([t, t]) = plΓ ([f, t]) = 4.
Proposition 12. ν1 PΓ ν2 iff plΓ (ν1) plΓ (ν2).
Proof. Suppose that plΓ (ν1)  plΓ (ν2). If plΓ (ν2) = n + 1 then ν2 /∈ ΔnP (Γ ), and so ν1 PΓ ν2. Otherwise, plΓ (ν1) = i and
plΓ (ν2) = j for some 1 i  j  n. In this case, as Δk (Γ ) is monotonically decreasing in k, necessarily ν1, ν2 ∈ Δk (Γ ) forP P
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that for every 1 k n, ν2 ∈ ΔkP (Γ ) implies that ν1 ∈ ΔkP (Γ ), thus ν1 PΓ ν2.
Suppose now that ν1 PΓ ν2. If ν2 /∈ ΔnP (Γ ), then plΓ (ν2) = n + 1, and so plΓ (ν1) n + 1 = plΓ (ν2). Otherwise, let i be
the minimal number such that ν2 ∈ ΔiP (Γ ). Then plΓ (ν2) = i. As ν1 PΓ ν2, we have that ν1 ∈ ΔkP (Γ ) for every k i. Thus
plΓ (ν1) i, and so plΓ (ν1) i = plΓ (ν2). 
Corollary 6. For every preferential setting P and prioritized theory Γ , PΓ is a total pre-order on ΛAtoms .
Proof. By Proposition 12, as  is clearly reﬂexive, transitive, and total. 
Corollary 7. The minimal elements of PΓ are the most plausible interpretations of Γ . That is, ΔP (Γ ) = {ν ∈ ΛAtoms | ∀μ ∈
ΛAtoms ν PΓ μ}.
Proof. By Proposition 12 and the fact that ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ) iff plΓ (ν) = 1. 
Corollary 8. For every preferential setting P and prioritized theory Γ , PΓ is a faithful order (in the sense of Deﬁnition 19).
Proof. By Corollaries 6 and 7. 
The next lemma will be useful in what follows:
Lemma 2. Let Γ be an n-prioritized theory and ψ a satisﬁable formula in L.
• if ν /∈mod(ψ) then ν is PΓ ⊕ψ -maximal.
• if ν,μ ∈mod(ψ) then ν PΓ ⊕ψ μ iff ν PΓ μ, and ν <PΓ ⊕ψ μ iff ν <PΓ μ.
Proof. Since Γ is n-prioritized, Γ ⊕ψ is (n+ 1)-prioritized. Also, as ψ is consistent, by (the proof of) Lemma 1, Δn+1P (Γ ⊕
ψ) = mod(ψ). Thus, if ν /∈ mod(ψ) then ν /∈ Δn+1P (Γ ⊕ ψ), and so, by the deﬁnition of PΓ , ν is PΓ ⊕ψ -maximal. For the
other item we note again that if ν,μ ∈ mod(ψ), it holds that ν,μ ∈ Δn+1P (Γ ⊕ ψ). Thus, the question whether each one of
these interpretations belongs to ΔiP (Γ ⊕ ψ), for every i  n, depends only on Γ and its preferential levels. 
Now we can prove the theorems:
Theorem 1. Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a setting where d is non-biased and f is hereditary. Then |P is a cautious consequence relation.
Proof. Cautious reﬂexivity follows from Proposition 7. For cautious monotonicity, suppose that Γ |P ψ , Γ |P φ, and
ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}). We show that ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ) and since Γ |P φ, we get that ν ∈mod(φ), and so Γ ⊕ {ψ} |P φ. Indeed, as
ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}) and since by Lemma 1 and its proof, ΔP (Γ ⊕ ψ) ⊆ Δn+1P (Γ ⊕ ψ) = mod(ψ), we have that ν ∈ mod(ψ).
Now, if ν /∈ ΔP (Γ ), there is a valuation μ ∈ ΔP (Γ ) such that μ <PΓ ν . As Γ |P ψ , μ ∈mod(ψ) as well. By Lemma 2, then,
μ <PΓ ⊕ψ ν . This is a contradiction to the fact that ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}) (see Corollary 7).
For cautious transitivity, suppose that Γ |P ψ and Γ ⊕{ψ} |P φ. If Γ 
|P φ, then there is a valuation ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ) such
that ν /∈mod(φ). Since Γ ⊕ {ψ} |P φ, ν /∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}), and so there is μ ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}), such that μ <PΓ ⊕ψ ν . Again, as
Δn+1P (Γ ⊕ {ψ}) =mod(ψ), we have that μ ∈mod(ψ). Also, since Γ |P ψ , ν ∈mod(ψ) as well. Thus, by Lemma 2, μ <PΓ ν .
Again, by Corollary 7, this contradicts the fact that ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ). 
Theorem 2. Let P = 〈d, f 〉 be a setting where d is non-biased and f is hereditary. Then |P is prioritized preferential.
Proof. Cautious monotonicity and cautious transitivity are shown in Theorem 1. Weak transitivity follows from the fact that
if ψ is satisﬁable then ΔP (Γ ⊕{ψ}) ⊆mod(ψ). For right weakening, note that | ψ → φ means that mod(ψ) ⊆mod(φ) and
Γ |P ψ means that ΔP (Γ ) ⊆ mod(ψ). Thus, ΔP (Γ ) ⊆ mod(φ), and so Γ |P φ. Left logical equivalence follows from the
fact that if | ψ ↔ φ then mod(ψ) =mod(φ). Thus, if ψ is satisﬁable, so is φ, and it holds that
ΔnP
(
Γ ⊕ {ψ})=mod(ψ) =mod(φ) = ΔnP (Γ ⊕ {φ}).
Otherwise, both ψ and φ are not satisﬁable, in which case
Δn
(
Γ ⊕ {ψ})= Δn (Γ ) = Δn (Γ ⊕ {φ}).P P P
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determined by the elements of Γ , we conclude that ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}) = ΔP (Γ ⊕ {φ}). Hence, Γ ⊕ {ψ} and Γ ⊕ {φ} have the
same |P -conclusions.
It remains to show the rule ‘Or’. For this, assume for a contradiction that Γ ⊕ {ψ ∨ φ} 
|P σ . If either ψ or φ is a
contradiction this immediately implies that either Γ ⊕ {ψ} 
|P σ or Γ ⊕ {φ} 
|P σ and we are done. So assume that both
ψ and φ are satisﬁable. In this case, there is a valuation ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕{ψ ∨φ}) ⊆mod(ψ ∨φ) such that ν(σ ) = f. By Lemma 2,
ν is PΓ -minimal in mod(ψ ∨ φ). Assume, without a loss of generality, that ν ∈ mod(ψ). In particular, ν is PΓ -minimal in
mod(ψ), and so ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ {ψ}). This contradicts the assumption that Γ ⊕ {ψ} |P σ . 
Theorem 3. A preferential setting P is characterized by faithful orders: for every prioritized theory Γ there is a faithful order PΓ
(depending on P and Γ ), such that ΔP (Γ ) = {ν ∈ ΛAtoms | ∀μ ∈ ΛAtoms ν PΓ μ}.
Proof. Immediately follows from Corollaries 7 and 8. 
Theorem 4. Let P be a preferential setting and Γ a prioritized theory on L. Then there is a faithful order PΓ (depending on P and
Γ ), such that, for every non-contradictory formula ψ in L, ΔP (Γ ⊕ ψ) =min(mod(ψ),PΓ ).
Proof. As Γ ⊕ ψ is (n+ 1)-prioritized, we have that
ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ ψ) ⇔ ν ∈ Δn+1P (Γ ⊕ ψ) and ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ ψ) (by the deﬁnition of ΔP )⇔ ν ∈mod(ψ) and ν ∈ ΔP (Γ ⊕ ψ) (ψ is satisﬁable)
⇔ ν ∈mod(ψ) and ∀μ ∈ ΛAtoms ν PΓ ⊕ψ μ (by Corollary 7)
⇔ ν ∈mod(ψ) and ∀μ ∈mod(ψ) ν PΓ μ (by Lemma 2)
⇔ ν ∈min(mod(ψ),PΓ ). 
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